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In recent years the Securities and Exchange Commission,
commonly known as the SEC, has been involved in a number of high-
profile suits that have attracted a good deal of media attention.
Among those prosecuted by the Commission are hedge fund billionaire
and Galleon Group founder Raj Rajaratnam,l investment/Ponzi-
scheme guru Bernie Madoff,2 television host and magazine publisher
Martha Stewart, 3 and colorful Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban. 4
Although such notable suits may simply be the SEC's attempt to
justify its own existence and role in the market it polices in light of the
financial disasters of the past decade, these cases do raise some
significant questions regarding the amount of power delegated to the
Commission by Congress.5 Specifically, what exactly is the scope of the
SEC's authority, and is there any limit on its ability to prosecute some
of the most powerful and prominent people in the country?
While the SEC seems to be engaged in some muscle-flexing
with regard to whom it chooses to prosecute, the Commission has also
attempted to broaden the scope of its statutory power, especially with
regard to the doctrine of insider trading.6 Rule 10b-5-the provision
utilized to prosecute inside traders-has experienced expansive
growth since its creation, developing from a mere statutory catchall
provision in the securities laws to one of the SEC's chief weapons in
combating insider trading and other fraudulent actions in the
securities markets.7 In fact, the liberal expansion of Rule 10b-5 from
its humble beginnings has been so vast that it led Chief Justice
1. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj Rajaratnam
with Insider Trading (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm.
2. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi
Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-293.htm.
3. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter Bacanovic with Illegal
Insider Trading (June 4, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-69.htm.
4. Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark Cuban (Nov. 7,
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-273.htm.
5. The Securities and Exchange Commission: Growing Insecurities, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17,
2009, at 37.
6. See Thomas 0. Gorman, Appealing Cuban: Aggressive Insider Trading Enforcement,
SEC ACTIONS (Oct. 8, 2009, 5:31 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=1570 (stating that the SEC's
decision to appeal the district court's ruling in Cuban "clearly demonstrates the Commission's
willingness to push the edge of insider trading . . . . [T]he SEC is pushing the edge of the
required legal obligation toward a parity of information standard").
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); see also Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller
Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 843, 843-44 (2009) (explaining that Rule 10b-5 was
promulgated pursuant to the "catchall" anti-fraud provision of § 10(b) and has since become a
powerful tool in combating security fraud).
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Rehnquist to remark that the Rule is "a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn."8
Despite the significant growth that Rule 10b-5 has undergone
since its enactment, the Supreme Court has always carefully limited
the Rule to its statutory roots of prohibiting deceptive and
manipulative conduct in the securities markets.9 Traditionally, to be
liable for insider trading, the trader had to owe a fiduciary duty to the
counterparty to the trade, or have a similar relationship of trust and
confidence with him.10 In the late 1990s, the Court adopted an
exception to this general rule known as the misappropriation theory."
Under this theory, the scope of liability extends beyond those who owe
a duty to the other transacting party to those who owe a duty only to
the source of the information. Although the misappropriation theory
recognizes liability where it did not previously exist, the theory is
consistent with the statutory roots of Rule 10b-5 because self-dealing
in confidential information, in breach of a duty owed to the source of
the information, is clearly deceptive conduct.12
This statutory constraint requiring deception on the part of the
trader is critical, and is conspicuously absent in the Commission's
recent adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).1 3 This bold rule extends liability
beyond fiduciary-like relationships to those who owe nothing more
than a duty of confidentiality to the source of the information.14
Although the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) in 2000 to clarify
the duty requirement of the misappropriation theory, the Rule
expands liability well beyond what the theory allows because trading
on information one merely has a duty to keep in confidence is not
deceptive conduct.16 This expansion of the insider trading doctrine's
scope thus begs the question: Has the Rule caused 10b-5 to outgrow its
statutory roots? And, if it has, what rule would best serve the interests
8. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
9. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977).
10. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
11. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (adopting the misappropriation
theory of insider trading).
12. See id. at 653-54 (explaining that the misappropriation theory satisfies § 10(b)'s
requirement of deceptive conduct because a fiduciary who feigns loyalty while converting
confidential information for personal gain defrauds the principle).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2010).
14. Id. ("[A] 'duty of trust or confidence' exists ... [w]henever a person agrees to maintain
information in confidence.").
15. See Rebecca S. Smith, Note, O'Hagan Revisited: Should a Fiduciary Duty Be Required
Under the Misappropriation Theory?, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1020 (2006) (explaining that
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) was adopted in response to numerous pleas for clarity regarding the
misappropriation theory's duty requirement).
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of the securities markets while adhering to 10b-5's statutory limits
restricting it to deceptive behavior?
This Note attempts to answer these questions by addressing
whether insider trading liability may be extended to those who trade
on nonpublic information while subject only to a confidentiality
agreement. Part II outlines the background of the insider trading
doctrine and the misappropriation theory. Part III analyzes whether
one who trades on information he has a duty to keep in confidence is
subject to insider trading liability, finding that such a duty is
insufficient for liability and that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is therefore invalid.
However, the loss of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) would generate confusion and
stifle the disclosure of information to parties lacking fiduciary duties
when such disclosure is beneficial or necessary for the management of
the company. To resolve the gap the annulment of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
would create, Part IV recommends that liability be limited to those
who hold a fiduciary duty or have agreed to refrain from self-dealing
in the confidential information.
II. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY: ORIGINS AND DESTINATION
While the history of the misappropriation theory reveals a
tendency on the part of both the SEC and the judiciary to expand the
reach of insider trading liability, it also establishes that the Supreme
Court has always anchored liability to the breach of a specific type of
duty. These aspects of the insider trading doctrine's development
demonstrate that the Supreme Court is willing to expand the doctrine
to fulfill the purposes of the securities laws, but only to a certain point.
As this Part will discuss, the Court has not extended insider trading
liability beyond the breach of a duty to refrain from self-dealing in the
confidential information.
A. Rule 10b-5 and Its Limitations
Like many financial regulations, the prohibition against
insider trading finds its origins in the increased federal involvement
resulting from the stock market crash of October 1929.16 The 73rd
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") to curb the
widespread abuse reported in the purchase and sale of securities and
16. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006); STEPHEN J.
CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: THE ESSENTIALS 18-19 (2008).
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to maintain fair and honest markets.17 While the Securities Act is
mostly concerned with primary market transactions between the
issuing corporation and investors, the Exchange Act deals chiefly with
secondary market transactions between two investors.18 One of the
principle aims of the Exchange Act was to protect investors and
promote public confidence in the securities markets by prohibiting
fraud and enacting disclosure requirements.19 In furtherance of this
goal, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act specifically prohibits the "use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security[,] ...
[of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe."20
Pursuant to the authority granted the SEC under § 10(b), the
Commission enacted Rule 10b-5 for the purpose of regulating fraud in
the securities markets. 21 The Rule was originally created in 1942 to
close a gap in the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, which
only prohibited fraud in the sale of securities and not their purchase.22
Although the Rule was only drafted as a gap-filler, it has since become
the leading weapon in the control of fraud in the securities markets
and, along with § 10(b), one of the primary provisions for prosecuting
insider trading.23 The Rule makes it unlawful to (1) "employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," (2) "make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact," or (3) engage in
an act which operates "as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."24
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2008) (explaining the purpose of the Exchange Act); Cent. Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994) (explaining
the securities laws were enacted in response to reports of widespread abuse in the securities
markets).
18. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 16, at 19.
19. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1238 (1995).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010); Chaffee, supra note 7, at 843-44.
22. LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 148 (3d ed. 2007); see
also Remarks of Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (explaining the circumstances under which Rule 10b-5 was
developed).
23. See David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation Theory of
Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 45 (1998) (noting that "section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
have become the primary provisions for prosecuting insider trading"); Chaffee, supra note 7, at
843-44 (discussing how § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "have become powerful tools in fighting securities
fraud').
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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While the power the SEC claims under Rule 10b-5 appears
expansive, the Supreme Court has placed restrictions on its scope. In
1977, the Supreme Court held in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green
that Rule 10b-5 is limited to (1) deceptive and manipulative devises,
and (2) issues that are not traditionally left to state law.2 5 The
defendant-corporation in Santa Fe executed a short-form merger, and
the dissatisfied minority shareholders chose to bring a federal claim
under Rule 10b-5 rather than pursuing their appraisal rights under
state law.2 6 The minority shareholders claimed that the corporation
had violated Rule 10b-5 by engaging in the merger without any
legitimate business purpose and by obtaining a fraudulent appraisal
to lull shareholders into selling their stocks at an inadequate price. 27
Looking to the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history,
the Court concluded that § 10(b) only prohibited conduct that involves
manipulation or deception. 28 Because the scope of Rule 10b-5 "cannot
exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b),"
both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are limited to manipulative and deceptive
conduct.29 The Court held that manipulative conduct requires actions
"intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity," which were not present in this case. 30 Deceptive conduct
generally entails material misstatements or omissions, and neither
occurred here because the minority shareholders received full
disclosure. 31 As the corporation's conduct was neither manipulative
nor deceptive, it fell outside the scope of Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b). 3 2
Therefore, the minority shareholders had failed to state a cause of
action. 33
The Santa Fe Court further stated that by enacting the
securities laws Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of
action in matters traditionally relegated to state law, such as
corporate law. 3 4 State law had already provided the minority
shareholders with a cause of action to recover the lost value of their
25. 430 U.S. 462, 473-74, 478 (1977).
26. Id. at 465-68. The Supreme Court had acknowledged that Rule 10b-5 allows for a
private cause of action for violations in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
27. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 468.
28. See id. at 473 ("The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception.").
29. Id. at 472-73 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214).
30. Id. at 476.
31. Id. at 474-76.
32. Id. at 473-74.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 478-79.
1474 [Vol. 63:5:1469
TRIMMING THE "JUDICIAL OAK"
shares through the appraisal process.35 Because state law had already
created a solution for minority shareholders in these types of
situations, the Court found it unlikely that Congress intended to
provide a similar federal remedy.36 The Court further believed that
extending the securities laws to cover state causes of action would
interfere with state corporate law. 3 7 If Rule 10b-5 could be invoked in
situations where a fiduciary treated a shareholder unfairly, then
federal courts would be forced to depart from applying state fiduciary
principles in favor of a federal fiduciary standard to ensure
uniformity. 38 Because there was no clear indication that Congress
desired to "federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations
that deals with transactions in securities," the Court was wary of
extending federal law to state causes of action. 39 The Court
consequently found that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could not be extended
to cover these aspects of state law.40
Santa Fe therefore restricts § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions to
deceptive and manipulative devices and matters that are not
traditionally left to state law. 41
B. The Development of the Classical Insider Trading Doctrine
Balancing the limitations Santa Fe placed on § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 against the Exchange Act's purpose of creating fair and efficient
securities markets has proven to be a difficult endeavor.42 This conflict
is especially apparent in the development of the classical insider
trading doctrine. 43 As the doctrine has developed, courts have
struggled to grant enough power to Rule 10b-5 to effectively control
insider trading, yet simultaneously limit the Rule to its statutory
requirements of deceptive and manipulative conduct.
35. Id. at 478.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 479.
38. Id. at 477, 479.
39. Id. at 479.
40. Id. at 480.
41. Id. at 478.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2008) (noting the purpose of the Exchange Act was to maintain fair
and efficient markets).
43. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1613 (1999) (explaining the
conflict between Santa Fe and the classical theory of insider trading is that Santa Fe held Rule
10b-5 did not reach claims that a shareholder was treated unfairly, yet the entire basis of the
classical insider trading doctrine is that a shareholder was treated unfairly by a fiduciary).
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In 1961, the SEC first concluded that insider trading violated
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 4 4 In addressing
insider trading, the Commission held that an insider must either
disclose the confidential information on which he is trading or abstain
from trading when (1) he has a relationship giving him access to
information intended for corporate purposes, and (2) it would be
inherently unfair for him to use the information to his advantage
without disclosing it to the other party.45 However, as Cady, Roberts
was an administrative ruling and not a court decision, it was not
immediately clear what precedential value the case would have. 46 It
was not until the Second Circuit accepted the Commission's holding
seven years later in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.4 7 that the courts
officially adopted the insider trading doctrine.48 Yet in confirming the
doctrine, the Second Circuit elected to greatly expand insider trading
liability beyond the requirements established by the SEC in Cady,
Roberts. The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur held that to ensure fairness
in the market, insider trading must be expanded beyond those having
a special relationship with the other transacting party to anyone in
possession of material inside information. 49 Essentially, the Second
Circuit required any person who obtained nonpublic information to
disclose the information prior to trading or to refrain from trading
altogether, regardless of whether the trader had a duty to refrain from
self-dealing in the information. The ruling in Texas Gulf Sulphur
effectively established a parity-of-information rule for insider trading
that required all investors to be on equal footing.50
The expanded scope that Rule 10b-5 enjoyed following the
Texas Gulf Sulphur decision was short-lived. Courts began to realize
the problems caused by such a broad proscription,5 1 and in 1980, the
Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States52 limited the reach of the
Rule, again anchoring it to its statutory origins. The Court held that
44. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); see also Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal
Enforcement of Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1035 n.62 (explaining that Cady, Roberts was the first decision
to hold insider trading violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
45. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
46. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAw: INSIDER TRADING 42 (2d ed. 2007).
47. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 848.
49. Id.
50. Jonn R. Beeson, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the
Misappropriation Theory, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1113 (1996).
51. See id. at 1114 (arguing an over-inclusive duty to disclose would deter the free flow of
information).
52. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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because § 10(b) only prohibits fraud based on nondisclosure, a trader
cannot be liable for insider trading unless he commits fraud by failing
to disclose the nonpublic information to the other party in light of a
duty to do so.53 Vincent Chiarella was a printer by trade and worked
for a company that printed announcements for corporate takeover
bids. 54 Although documents related to the takeover bids had the
identities of the acquiring and target corporations concealed by blank
spaces or false names (which were later replaced by the true names
the night before printing), Chiarella was able to deduce the identities
of the companies before the final printing.55 Chiarella traded on this
confidential information without disclosing it to the other party for a
profit of $30,000.56 The SEC claimed that Chiarella's actions
amounted to insider trading in violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act
along with Rule 10b-5, and he was convicted on all counts.57
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction, holding
that mere possession of material, nonpublic information is an
insufficient basis for insider trading liability under § 10(b) absent an
affirmative duty to disclose the information.5 8 In doing so, the Court
rejected the Second Circuit's parity-of-information rule from Texas
Gulf Sulphur and explained that a general duty to disclose
information or abstain from trading does not exist.59 The Court
reasoned that although § 10(b) is a catchall provision, what it catches
must be considered fraud.60 Further, when the alleged fraud is "based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."61
The failure to disclose, therefore, can only be considered fraudulent if
the trader has a specific duty to disclose the information. 62 Because a
trader merely in possession of nonpublic information has no specific
duty to disclose the information, there is no fraud-and consequently
no liability under § 10(b)-if he uses the information for trading
purposes. 63 Regarding the requisite duty, the Court held that "the
53. Id. at 234-35.
54. Id. at 224.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id. at 235-36.
59. Id. at 233.
60. Id. at 234-35.
61. Id. The Second Circuit has recently held that the duty requirement established in
Chiarella is limited to insider trading allegations based on omissions and does not extend to
those based on material misrepresentations. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48-50 (2d Cir. 2009).
62. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
63. See id. at 231 ("Petitioner's use of [the confidential] information was not a fraud under
§ 10(b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.").
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duty to disclose arises when one party has information 'that the other
party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them.' "64 Chiarella thus
establishes that absent a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust
and confidence, a person in possession of confidential information
cannot be liable for insider trading.65
Although Chiarella redirected the evolution of the classical
insider trading doctrine back toward its statutory underpinnings,
where liability is rooted in fraud through nondisclosure, the decision
left many holes in the insider trading doctrine that needed to be
filled.66 Because Chiarella required a special relationship between the
trader and the other transacting party, a significant gap was created
in which traders who obtained confidential information but were not
fiduciaries of the company or its shareholders were exempt from the
prohibition altogether.67 To resolve this problem, the Court adopted
the misappropriation theory of insider trading.68
C. Expansion of Insider Trading: Acceptance of the
Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory expanded the insider trading
doctrine by allowing for liability when Chiarella's requisite duty is
owed to the trader's source of the information, even when the trader
owes no duty to the other transacting party.69 The misappropriation
theory arose out of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella,70 in
which he claimed that Chiarella committed fraud by misappropriating
valuable, confidential information that was entrusted to him by the
offeror corporation.71 Such a fraudulent act, Burger argued, would
clearly violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and therefore Chiarella should
64. Id. at 228 n.9 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
65. Id. at 229.
66. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 98-99 (noting the significant gaps in the law of
insider trading following the Chiarella decision).
67. See id. (providing an example of what the insider trading doctrine failed to cover
following Chiarella).
68. Id. at 50.
69. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (explaining the misappropriation
theory).
70. Nathan Heyde, Note, Can You Keep a Secret? The "Similar Relationship of Trust and
Confidence" in Misappropriation Theory: U.S. v. Kim, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 653, 667 (2004).
71. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 240 ("I would read § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean
that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose
that information or to refrain from trading.").
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have been held liable for insider trading.72 Though the
misappropriation theory had its roots in the Chiarella decision, it took
nearly twenty years for the Supreme Court to officially accept the
doctrine. 73
In Dirks v. SEC,74 the Supreme Court took the first step toward
accepting the misappropriation theory by extending the reach of
§ 10(b) liability beyond those who have a fiduciary-like relationship
with the other transacting party.75 The defendant, Raymond Dirks,
was an investment analyst who learned from a former officer of Equity
Funding of America that the company was fraudulently overvaluing
its assets.76 After researching the matter and confirming that Equity
Funding was engaged in fraud, Dirks spread word throughout the
market, causing the company's stock price to plummet and forcing
Equity Funding into receivership.77 The SEC later discovered that
before the information had become formally known to the public,
Dirks had advised clients to sell their stock in the corporation.78
Rather than rewarding Dirks, the Commission accused him of aiding
and abetting violations of the securities laws, including § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, but only censured him due to his role in uncovering Equity
Funding's massive fraud.79 Dirks sought review by the Supreme Court
and the ruling was reversed.80
In reversing the SEC's ruling, the Court reaffirmed its holding
in Chiarella that possession of confidential information, absent a duty
to the other party to disclose, is not enough to trigger liability under
Rule 10b-5 or § 10(b) for insider trading.81 However, the Court also
recognized that a ban on some "tippee" trading is necessary. It held:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on
material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to
72. Id. at 245.
73. Chiarella was decided in 1980 and the doctrine was finally accepted by the Supreme
Court in 1997 in United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
74. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
75. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis,
Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider
Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 372-73 (noting that because of the Dirks
decision, "the courts developed a concept of a temporary or constructive fiduciary").
76. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648-49.
77. Id. at 650.
78. Id. at 650-51.
79. Id. at 650-52.
80. Id. at 652.
81. Id. at 657-58.
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the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach. 82
According to the Court, an insider who provides confidential
information to another party breaches his fiduciary duty when the
insider will "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." 83 In
essence, because the insider breached a duty to refrain from
personally benefitting from the confidential information, the tippee
becomes a "temporary or constructive fiduciary" of the trading party
and can therefore be liable for insider trading.84 Because Dirks had no
pre-existing fiduciary duty to Equity Funding shareholders and the
insider who passed along the information obtained no personal benefit
by notifying Dirks of the fraud, Dirks could not be liable for insider
trading and thus the SEC's ruling was reversed.85
By extending liability for insider trading beyond circumstances
in which the trader owes a fiduciary duty to the trading party, the
Court in Dirks took a significant step toward the adoption of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading. While the Dirks Court
maintained that the breach of a fiduciary-like duty owed to the
shareholders was necessary, it revealed the Court's willingness to
expand the duty requirement to meet desirable policy outcomes.86
However, following the Chiarella and Dirks decisions, confusion still
lingered as to whether the misappropriation theory was an acceptable
basis of liability, and circuits began to split over the issue. While the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits rejected the misappropriation theory, the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits accepted it.87 The Supreme Court
ultimately saw the need to resolve the issue and did so in 1997 in
United States v. O'Hagan.88
In O'Hagan, the Court formally adopted the misappropriation
theory of insider trading liability and again revealed its flexibility
82. Id. at 659-60 (emphasis added). Tippees are those who owe no fiduciary duties to the
corporation or its shareholders and have been given confidential information, usually by an
insider. Id. at 655.
83. Id. at 662.
84. Kamman & Hood, supra note 75, at 372-73; see also Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading
and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1338 (2009) (describing
the duty imposed by Dirks as a fictional fiduciary duty).
85. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665-67.
86. Nagy, supra note 84, at 1338.
87. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649-50 & n.3 (1997).
88. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). While the Supreme Court took up the misappropriation theory in
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court split 4-4 and therefore affirmed the
lower court ruling without issuing an opinion. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 102.
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with respect to the duty requirement. 89 James O'Hagan was a partner
in a law firm that was aiding Grand Metropolitan in a tender offer to
acquire the Pillsbury Company.90 While O'Hagan did not work on the
representation, he obtained information regarding the acquisition and
began to purchase call options for Pillsbury stock.91 When the tender
offer was announced, O'Hagan sold his call options for an astounding
profit of more than $4.3 million.92 The SEC took notice and charged
O'Hagan with securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 9 3
O'Hagan was eventually convicted and sentenced to a 41-month term
of imprisonment. 94 The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the
misappropriation theory of liability and reversed his conviction. 95
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision and formally held that the misappropriation theory may be
the basis of liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.9 6 The Court
reasoned that nowhere in § 10(b) does it state that the required
fraudulent nondisclosure must be based on a breached duty owed to
the counterparty in the transaction; instead, "§ 10(b) refers to 'the
purchase or sale of any security,' not to identifiable purchasers or
sellers of securities."97 Therefore, the Court held that while a duty to
not disclose the information is still necessary to find liability, the
requisite duty need not be owed to the other party in the transaction,
but rather can be owed to the source of the information.98
The O'Hagan Court further reaffirmed the holding in Santa Fe
that § 10(b) required "chargeable conduct [to] involve a 'deceptive
device or contrivance' used 'in connection with' the purchase or sale of
securities."99 The conduct alleged under the misappropriation theory
satisfies these fraudulent and deceptive elements because the
misappropriator is, in essence, "feigning fidelity" to the source of the
information while misappropriating the information for his own
personal benefit.100 The Court found that because O'Hagan's
pretended loyalty to his employer was fraudulent and deceptive, the
89. See Nagy, supra note 84, at 1339 (claiming O'Hagan "painted fiduciary principles with
an extremely broad brush").
90. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
91. Id. at 647-48.
92. Id. at 648.
93. Id. at 648-49.
94. Id. at 649.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 650.
97. Id. at 660.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 653.
100. Id. at 655-56.
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requirements of § 10(b) were satisfied.10 Finally, the Court found that
O'Hagan's conduct was "in connection with" a securities transaction
because his fraud was consummated when he traded on the
information without disclosing to his principal his intent to trade.102
There are two additional points to note about the Court's
decision in O'Hagan. The first is the critical role deception plays in
conduct that is prohibited under § 10(b).103 According to the Court,
nondisclosure to the source of the information would not have
produced liability under § 10(b) if it was done without deception. 104
This means that absent some other deceptive act, had O'Hagan merely
revealed to his source (his employer) that he intended to trade on the
information, Rule 10b-5 would not have been violated and he could not
have been held liable for insider trading.105 Liability under the
misappropriation theory, therefore, completely turns on the deceptive
breach of a duty the trader owes to the source of the information.106
The second point to note in O'Hagan is that the Supreme Court
was once again willing to expand the reach of the insider trading
doctrine. 07 While the Court in Chiarella held that the trader must
owe a duty to the other transacting party to be liable, this was
extended in Dirks so that even one who does not have the requisite
fiduciary-like relationship could inherit it if the tipper breaches a duty
to his own benefit.108 The Court in O'Hagan again expanded liability
by permitting § 10(b) to serve as the basis of liability for insider
trading when the trader breaches a duty owed not to the other trading
party, but merely to the source of the information. 09 This is true even
though the only harm the source suffers in this situation is the loss of
its exclusive use of the information." 0 The Supreme Court's expansion
of the doctrine in O'Hagan and Dirks reveals that the Court is willing
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 654 ("Deception through nondisclosure is central to the theory of liability for
[the misappropriation theory].").
104. Id. at 655.
105. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 116; see also Nagy, supra note 84, at 1339 (discussing
how O'Hagan essentially creates a safe harbor provision, allowing misappropriators to avoid
insider trading liability by simply disclosing their intent to trade).
106. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
107. See Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 269, 287 (1999) (noting the decision in O'Hagan extends the principles advanced in
Chiarella).
108. Nagy, supra note 84, at 1338.
109. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650-52.
110. Id. at 652.
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to stretch the fiduciary duty requirement if necessary to obtain
advantageous policy results.111
D. Rule 1Ob 5-2(b)(1) and Confidentiality Agreements
Encouraged by the Court's expansion of liability in O'Hagan,
the Commission promulgated Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) in one of its boldest
attempts to extend the scope of insider trading liability beyond
fiduciary-like relationships to duties of confidentiality.112 The Rule
was adopted in a direct attempt to restrict the holding of a 1991
Second Circuit case the SEC strongly disagreed with: United States
v. Chestman.113 Chestman was the first significant court opinion to
define which types of relationships outside of the traditional fiduciary
duties are sufficient bases for insider trading liability, and it remains
the leading decision on the matter.114
The facts of the Chestman decision "read as if they were lifted
out of an exaggerated law school exam." 115 Ira Waldbaum was the
president and controlling shareholder of Waldbaum, Inc.
("Waldbaum"), a large supermarket chain.116 Ira decided to sell
Waldbaum for $50 a share and conveyed this information to his sister,
Shirley Waldbaum, who told her daughter, Susan Loeb. 1 7 Susan then
relayed the information to her husband, Keith Loeb, who revealed it to
his stockbroker, Robert Chestman.118 Each person in the chain was
told to keep the information confidential. 19 Chestman subsequently
bought stock in Waldbaum based on this information and the SEC
brought charges against him for violating Rule 10b-5 under the
111. See Nagy, supra note 84, at 1339-40 ("Chiarella, Dirks, and O'Hagan evidence a
Supreme Court willing to stretch fiduciary principles to no small degree, when doing so
facilitates a desirable policy outcome.").
112. Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 596 (2008).
113. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Kamman & Hood, supra note 75, at 387-88
(explaining that the SEC extended insider trading to duties of confidentiality through Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) in an attempt to reverse the ruling in Chestman); Steinbuch, supra note 112, at 596
(stating the SEC "promulgated Rule 10b5-2 in response to limitations on the misappropriation
theory suggested in Chestman").
114. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 79-80 (noting Chestman is the best guidance to date for
determining the sufficiency of nontraditional relationships).
115. Keith Valory, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: What
Constitutes a "Similar Relationship of Trust and Confidence?", 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 297
(1998) (quoting David A. Lipton, Insider Trading with Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at
F 13).






misappropriation theory, which had already been adopted in the
Second Circuit at the time. 120 The government argued that Keith Loeb
owed a fiduciary duty to his wife, Susan, which he breached by
disclosing the information regarding the sale of Waldbaum to
Chestman.121 The trial court found Chestman guilty on all counts.122
In reversing the lower court's decision,123 the Second Circuit
defined which types of relationships beyond traditional fiduciary
duties could lead to insider trading liability. 124 The court first found
that neither unilaterally entrusting another with confidential
information nor a familial relationship alone is enough to create a
fiduciary duty.125 However, the court noted that under Chiarella,
either a fiduciary duty or a similar relationship of trust and confidence
could be sufficient for liability.126 The phrase "similar relationship of
trust and confidence" allowed the court to look beyond the traditional
"hornbook fiduciary relations" to other nontraditional relationships to
serve as the basis of liability.127 Therefore, even if Keith Loeb lacked a
traditional fiduciary duty to his wife, if the relationship could be
deemed a "similar relationship of trust and confidence," it could satisfy
Chiarella's duty requirement.128
The Second Circuit concluded that only relationships that had
comparable characteristics to a fiduciary relationship-namely
discretionary authority and dependency-could be considered a
"similar relationship of trust and confidence."129 In doing so, the court
intentionally chose to be cautious in extending the misappropriation
theory to new relationships to avoid federalizing more state law than
was absolutely necessary, thereby heeding the Supreme Court's
warning in Santa Fe.130 Because Keith Loeb did not owe his wife
Susan a fiduciary duty, and because marital relationships lack the
essential characteristics of a fiduciary relationship and thus cannot be
120. Id. at 566.
121. Id. at 570.
122. Id. at 555-56.
123. Id. at 554.
124. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 81.
125. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-68.
126. Id. at 556, 564-65.
127. The Court found traditional "hornbook fiduciary relations" to be those "between
attorney and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and trust
beneficiary, and senior corporate official and shareholder." Id. at 568.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 567-69.
130. Id. at 567.
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considered a "similar relationship of trust and confidence," the Second
Circuit reversed Chestman's conviction. 131
The SEC, however, disagreed with the result in Chestman.
This disagreement, combined with the weight courts gave to the
Chestman opinion, prompted the Commission to adopt a broad
definition of which types of relationships are sufficient for liability. 132
In particular, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) to clarify the
duties upon which liability may rest under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.133
While the SEC was chiefly concerned with the effect Chestman would
have on information shared in familial and personal relationships, the
Commission also took the opportunity to clarify what it saw as the
existing law regarding confidentiality agreements. 134 Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
states that although the duty requirement can be satisfied in
numerous ways, the requisite " 'duty of trust or confidence' exists ...
[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence."1 35
Although the Commission enacted Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) to reflect the
common-sense concept that the necessary duty can arise through
agreement between the parties, the wording of the Rule has
significant implications as to the limits of insider trading liability.136
Essentially, the Rule extends liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
those who trade on information they agreed to keep confidential,
regardless of whether the trader has any fiduciary-like relationship
with the informer.
By liberally interpreting the phrase "relationship of trust and
confidence" through Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), the SEC essentially dispensed
with the duty element of insider trading established by the Court in
Chiarella and O'Hagan, thereby significantly expanding liability
under the misappropriation theory.137 Though the Commission
claimed that by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) it did not intend to modify
the scope of the judicially created insider trading law, an analysis of
131. Id. at 571.
132. Nagy, supra note 84, at 1357-59 (noting that courts turned to Chestman for guidance in
determining which duties are considered a "similar relationship of trust and confidence" and that
the SEC responded to Chestman's narrow view by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)).
133. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,603 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, & 249).
134. Id. at 72,602-03.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2010).
136. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,603 (explaining that
the Rule "reflects the common-sense notion ... that reasonable expectations of confidentiality,
and corresponding duties, can be created by an agreement between two parties").
137. See Nagy, supra note 84, at 1361 (stating the Rule dispenses with the "relational
elements of trust and loyalty essential to O'Hagan's reasoning").
2010] 1485
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the Rule itself reveals otherwise.138 While the Supreme Court in
Chiarella and O'Hagan required a relationship of trust and confidence
in the absence of a fiduciary duty, 139 Rule 10b5-2(b) claims that
liability may be based on duties of trust or confidence. 140 By changing
the "and" in Chiarella and O'Hagan to "or," the Rule severs the trust
aspect from the confidence aspect and declares that either duty alone
is sufficient for insider trading liability. Indeed, this modification is
further evidenced by Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), which establishes that a duty
of confidentiality alone satisfies the duty requirement.141 This
significant alteration raises the question as to whether the SEC's
expansion of the doctrine and the Rule itself are valid. The answer to
this difficult issue turns on how far the phrase "relationship of trust
and confidence" can and should be extended.
This Note will now examine whether a duty of confidentiality
alone is enough to establish insider trading liability. It finds that
liability cannot be based on confidentiality agreements alone, for
although the Supreme Court has been willing to stretch the duty
requirement in the past, the Court has always required more than a
duty to keep information in confidence. Further, as seen in Santa Fe
and O'Hagan, the Court has continually maintained that the central
element in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations is fraud through
nondisclosure, which is absent in circumstances where the trader is
only bound by a duty of confidentiality.142 For these reasons, and as
this Note discusses in Part IV, the best solution to this problem is to
extend insider trading liability to those who have a duty to refrain
from self-dealing in the information, but not so far as to cover those
who have a duty of confidentiality alone.
Before reaching this solution, this Note first analyzes the
rulings of various lower courts regarding the validity of Rule 10b5-
138. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,603 ("Mhis Rule is not
intended to address or modify the scope of insider trading law in any other respect.").
139. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997) (adopting the "relationship
of trust and confidence" requirement of Chiarella into the misappropriation theory); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (requiring that the trader hold a relationship of trust
and confidence to be liable for insider trading).
140. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.105b-2 (explaining in the preliminary note that "[t]his section
provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or
confidence for purposes of the 'misappropriation' theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of
the Act and Rule 10b-5") (emphasis added); see also Brief for Allen Ferrell et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendant, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (Civil Action No.
3:08-CV-2050-D) ('The SEC's use of the phrase 'trust or confidence' in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), as
opposed to the O'Hagan standard of 'trust and confidence,' suggests that the SEC sought to go
beyond the O'Hagan articulation of the misappropriation theory.").
141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
142. See supra notes 28-32, 103-106 and accompanying text.
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2(b)(1) and whether a duty of confidentiality on its own can establish
insider trading liability.
III. DIFFERING VIEWS OF A "SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE" AND THE VALIDITY OF RULE 10b5-2(b)(1)
A. Where the Courts Stand on the Issue
Because the duty requirement of insider trading was
established by the courts,143 we must first turn to the courts to
determine its scope and whether a duty of confidentiality suffices.
Although the question has great implications on the reach of the
insider trading doctrine, the scope of the phrase "similar relationship
of trust and confidence" has never been considered by the Supreme
Court. The Second Circuit's opinion in Chestman consequently
remains the most influential source on the matter.144 However, several
courts at both the appellate and district levels have analyzed the
issue, and while some have held that the phrase permits
confidentiality agreements to serve as the basis of liability, others
have rejected such a broad view.
1. Cases Supporting a Broad View of the Duty Requirement
Some of the most notable decisions supporting a more liberal
reading of the duty requirement are United States v. Falcone,145 SEC
v. Yun,146 and SEC v. Northern.147 Falcone was decided by the Second
Circuit in 2001, and although the facts of the case involve a tipper-
tippee scenario rather than one in which a duty of confidentiality was
breached, the opinion suggests that a confidentiality agreement alone
can subject one to insider trading liability.148 In Falcone, then-Judge
143. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (establishing the duty requirement); see also supra notes
51-65 and accompanying text.
144. See Nagy, supra note 84, at 1357-59 (noting that courts often look to Chestman for
guidance in determining which duties are considered a "similar relationship of trust and
confidence").
145. 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001).
146. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
147. 598 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Mass. 2009). For less influential cases which suggest that a
duty of confidentiality is sufficient to establish insider trading liability, see SEC v. Lyon, 529 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2006),
rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008), and SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144,
1150-51 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
148. See Falcone, 257 F.3d at 227-28, 234 (holding that "a fiduciary relationship, or its
functional equivalent, exists only where there is explicit acceptance of a duty of confidentiality or
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Sotomayor, writing for the court, found that the functional equivalent
of a fiduciary relationship exists where either the trading party
accepts a duty of confidentiality or such acceptance can be implied
from the relationship between the parties. 149 In reaching this
conclusion, the Second Circuit interpreted Chestman as only requiring
a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence when
the trader lacks an express duty of confidentiality.15 0 This
interpretation of Chestman is interesting, considering it directly
conflicts with the bulk of the opinion. In Chestman, the court took
great pains in establishing that absent a fiduciary relationship, a
trader may only be liable if he has a duty with the same
characteristics of a fiduciary duty.151 Furthermore, the Chestman
court applied this interpretation of a "similar relationship of trust and
confidence" to the confidentiality agreement at issue in the case and
found that the duty requirement was not met.152 Regardless of these
inconsistencies, Falcone is often cited for the position that an
agreement to keep information confidential is sufficient to satisfy the
duty requirement for insider trading liability.153
Another influential circuit case that supports a broad view of
the insider trading doctrine is SEC v. Yun, where the Eleventh Circuit
held that a confidentiality agreement alone was sufficient to satisfy
§ 10(b)'s duty requirement.154 The defendant, Donna Yun, was married
to David Yun, the president of Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc. 155 David
communicated nonpublic information to Donna regarding an
upcoming announcement that would decrease the value of Scholastic's
stock, and she agreed to keep the information confidential.15 6 Donna
where such acceptance may be implied from a similar relationship of trust and confidence
between the parties").
149. Id. at 234.
150. Id. at 234-35.
151. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-69 (2d Cir. 1991).
152. Id. at 571; see also supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
153. E.g., SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on Falcone to
establish that acceptance of a duty of confidentiality satisfies the requisite duty for insider
trading); SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1054-55 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd on other grounds,
530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on Falcone and Yun to establish that an express
agreement to not reveal confidential information meets the duty requirement for insider
trading); SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (relying on Falcone to
support Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)).
154. 327 F.3d 1263, 1273-75 (11th Cir. 2003).
155. Id. at 1267.
156. Id.
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relayed the information to her coworker, Jerry Burch, 15 7 who traded
on the information for a $269,000 profit-a 1,300 percent return on his
investment. 15 8 Both Donna and Burch were found jointly liable for
violating Rule 10b-5 and were ordered to disgorge the profits
acquired.159 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the duty
requirement could be satisfied not only by a fiduciary-like
relationship, but also by either an express agreement of confidentiality
or a showing that the disclosing party had a reasonable expectation
that the information would be safeguarded.160 Although allowing a
party's expectations to establish the duty requirement comes
dangerously close to conflicting with the Supreme Court's holding in
Chiarella that mere possession of nonpublic information is
insufficient,161 the court found that Donna's confidentiality agreement,
along with her history of keeping David's business information
confidential, satisfied the duty element of the misappropriation
theory.162
The issue was also recently addressed in SEC v. Northern, in
which the Massachusetts District Court held that a duty to keep
information confidential was enough to establish liability and
explicitly rejected the defendant's argument that the SEC had
exceeded its rulemaking authority in enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).1 63 In
Northern, Peter Davis (a financial consultant) attended a U.S.
Department of Treasury press conference where he was given
nonpublic information regarding the suspension of 30-year bonds,
which he was told to keep confidential until 10:00 a.m. that same
day. 164 Before the embargo on the information had expired, Davis
passed the information on to Steven Northern (his client) who traded
on the information for a multi-million dollar profit.165 The court found
the duty of confidentiality imposed on Davis by the Treasury
157. Although neither party admitted that Donna revealed the information to Burch, Burch
told his stockbroker he wanted to purchase the options based on information he learned at a
cocktail party the night before, which he attended with Donna. Id. at 1268.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1270.
160. Id. at 1273.
161. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); see also infra notes 217-23 and
accompanying text.
162. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273-75. Although both defendants met these requirements, the court
reversed the convictions on other grounds. See id. at 1281-82 (granting a new trial because the
district court only required the SEC to show that Donna Yun had been severely reckless in
disclosing the confidential information).
163. 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174, 176 (D. Mass. 2009).




Department sufficient to establish liability, and consequently denied
Northern's motion for summary judgment. 166 In doing so, the court
briefly discussed whether Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) was inconsistent with the
language of § 10(b) and therefore beyond the scope of the SEC's
rulemaking authority, but ultimately rejected this argument without
much analysis. 167 The court further remarked: "[I]t appears that the
Supreme Court acknowledged that a contract providing a corporate
outsider access to confidential information may be sufficient to create
a duty from which misappropriation liability may arise," and thus a
contractual duty could take the place of the requisite fiduciary-like
duty.168 By denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the court gave credence to the view that a confidentiality agreement
alone satisfies the duty requirement for insider trading liability.
2. Cases Supporting a Narrow View of the Duty Requirement
While a number of courts have supported the SEC's theory that
a duty of confidentiality meets the duty element of insider trading,
other courts have specifically addressed and rejected this view. Two
cases demonstrating this are United States v. Kiml69 and SEC
v. Cuban.170
In Kim, a California district court held that a confidentiality
agreement failed to satisfy the duty requirement because the
obligation was not sufficiently similar to a fiduciary relationship. 171
The defendant, Keith Joon Kim, was a member of an organization of
young company presidents in which all members, as a condition of
membership, were expected to comply with a written confidentiality
agreement and to not discuss anything learned through the
organization with others.172 Kim obtained confidential information
from another member and traded on it for a profit of over $200,000.173
Because Kim's liability was not based on a typical fiduciary duty, the
court had to determine whether a duty of confidentiality alone could
be considered a "similar relationship of trust and confidence." 174 In
166. Id. at 176.
167. Id. at 174.
168. Id. at 175.
169. 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
170. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, No. 09-10996, 2010 WL 3633059 (5th Cir.
Sept. 21, 2010).
171. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
172. Id. at 1008.
173. Id. at 1008-09.
174. Id. at 1010.
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making this determination, the court looked to the Chestman opinion
for the proposition that a "similar relationship of trust and confidence"
must have characteristics similar to those of a fiduciary duty.175
The court found that because there was no disparate
knowledge or expertise, no persuasive need to share confidential
information, and no legal duty to render competent aid, a duty of
confidentiality alone could not be considered a "similar relationship of
trust and confidence."176 Although the actions in this case occurred
before the SEC enacted Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), the court reviewed the Rule
and concluded that an express agreement of confidentiality can serve
as the basis of liability only if the agreement creates a relationship
that has the "hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship." 77 Finally, the
court noted that although the members of the organization were
bound by an express confidentiality agreement, the agreement could
not be the basis of liability because it only appealed to the members'
morality and did not give rise to any legal duties. 178 The allegations
were therefore dismissed. 179
In the 2009 high-profile case of SEC v. Cuban, a Texas district
court took a similar stance on the issue to the court in Kim, holding
that insider trading liability could not be based on a duty of
confidentiality alone. 80 However, the court went even further than the
Kim court and questioned the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) itself.181
Mark Cuban-the well-known owner of the Dallas Mavericks-
obtained nonpublic information from the CEO of Mamma.coml 82
regarding a planned private investment in public equity offering (more
commonly known as a PIPE offering) by the company and agreed to
keep the information in confidence.183 Cuban traded on the
information and avoided a loss in excess of $750,000.184
The court found that while no fiduciary relationship existed
between the CEO of Mamma.com and Cuban, a sufficient duty could
arise through agreement. 85 Such an agreement, however, would have
175. Id. at 1011-12.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1014-15.
178. Id. at 1015.
179. Id.
180. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725-26 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, No. 09-10996, 2010 WML 3633059
(5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010).
181. Id. at 730.
182. Mamma.com is a Canadian based search engine, in which Mark Cuban was the largest
known shareholder. Id. at 717.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 718.
185. Id. at 725.
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to "consist of more than an express or implied promise merely to keep
information confidential. It must also impose on the party who
receives the information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or
otherwise using the information for personal gain." 186 The court's
rationale for this was that § 10(b) was intended to prevent deceptive
conduct in the securities markets, so if the trader only promises to
keep the information confidential and does not promise to refrain from
using it for personal gain, there is no deception.187 Essentially, absent
a duty to refrain from using the information for personal benefit, it is
not deceptive to do so. 8 Because Cuban did not promise to abstain
from using the information to his benefit, his actions were not
deceptive and therefore not prohibited by § 10(b).189
The Cuban court additionally found that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
could not be relied upon to establish liability because the SEC had
exceeded its authority in enacting the regulation.190 The court
reasoned that § 10(b) only enabled the Commission to enact rules
prohibiting fraudulent conduct, and because trading on information
one is only required to keep confidential is not fraudulent, the SEC
lacked the authority to enact the regulation.191 Because the SEC could
not rely on either the confidentiality agreement itself or Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) to provide the basis for insider trading liability, the case was
dismissed.192
Although the Cuban court's ruling was later vacated on appeal
because the Fifth Circuit believed there was sufficient evidence to find
that Cuban had, in fact, agreed to not use the information for his own
benefit, the lower court's opinion continues to strongly support the
view that confidentiality agreements are inadequate to establish
liability.193 In overruling the judgment, the Fifth Circuit did not
challenge the legal conclusion of the lower court that an agreement to
refrain from benefiting from the nonpublic information was necessary
for liability. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit believed that there was
at least a plausible basis that Cuban had agreed to not trade on the
186. Id.
187. Id. at 724-25.
188. Id. at 725.
189. Id. at 731.
190. Id. at 730-31.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 731. Although the Cuban court gave the SEC thirty days to file an amended
complaint alleging Cuban had accepted a duty to not use the nonpublic information, the SEC
chose not to amend its complaint and the district court thereafter dismissed the action. Id. at
731-32.
193. SEC v. Cuban, No. 09-10996, 2010 WL 3633059, at *5 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010).
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information, and therefore summary judgment was improper under
the lower court's legal standard. Because the Fifth Circuit vacated the
ruling on the grounds that summary judgment had been improperly
granted, the appellate court declined to address the validity of Rule
10b5-2(b)(1), effectively punting on the issue.
B. Failings of the Broad View: Analysis of Confidentiality Agreements
and Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
As the previous cases reveal, courts have split over the scope of
the phrase "similar relationship of trust and confidence." While some
have adopted a broad view, extending the phrase to cover
confidentiality agreements, others have opted for a much narrower
approach, placing such agreements beyond the reach of Rule 10b-5
and the insider trading doctrine. This Note now examines the
arguments raised by these cases to determine whether a duty of
confidentiality may serve as a sufficient basis for liability and the
validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).
It is well established that for the duty element to be satisfied, a
fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence must exist.194
Because a confidentiality agreement alone fails to establish a fiduciary
relationship between the parties, to be sufficient such a duty must fall
into the second category of relationships: a similar relationship of
trust and confidence. There are four reasons drawn from the case law
that a duty of confidentiality alone fails to meet the duty element for
establishing insider trading liability.
First, confidentiality agreements lack the traditional hallmark
characteristics of fiduciary relationships. In Chestman, the leading
case on similar relationships of trust and confidence, the Second
Circuit stated that the term "similar" denotes that the essential
characteristics of fiduciary duties must be present.195 Such
characteristics include de facto control and dominance, superiority and
influence, and discretionary authority and dependency on the part of
the fiduciary.196 Black's Law Dictionary describes a fiduciary as one
who "is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters
within the scope of their relationship."'9 7 In Kim, a federal district
court asserted that fiduciary relationships arise out of a combination
194. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
195. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991).
196. Id. at 568-69.
197. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2007).
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of disparate knowledge and expertise, a persuasive need to share
confidential information, and a legal duty to render competent aid.198
Under this backdrop, it is difficult to understand how
confidentiality agreements can meet this high standard. A duty of
confidentiality can be imposed upon any person without any obligation
for that person to act for the benefit of the disclosing party.
Additionally, there is no need for superiority, dominance, disparate
knowledge, or influence on the part of the individual with the duty of
confidentiality. Indeed, as can be seen from Northern, a duty of
confidentiality can be imposed with as little as a statement to the
party that the information should be kept confidential, with no other
special duty on the bound person.'99 Because confidentiality
agreements fail to impose the classical fiduciary characteristics of
dominance, control, or a duty to act for the benefit of the other party,
such agreements cannot be considered similar to fiduciary duties.
Additionally, while the Dirks and O'Hagan cases reveal a
certain willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to manipulate
the duty element to meet the needs of practicality and fairness, the
Court's decisions have always been anchored upon a duty to refrain
from self-dealing in the inside information. Although the Court agreed
in Dirks to extend liability to those who were tipped on inside
information, such liability could only attach to the tippee if the tipper
breached a duty to refrain from benefitting from the confidential
information. 200 Similarly, although the Court in O'Hagan declared
that a duty owed to the source of the information rather than to the
counterparty to the trade was sufficient to find insider trading
liability, the Court maintained that a duty to not benefit from the
information was still required for liability. 201 These cases clearly
illustrate that although the Court is willing to extend liability when
necessary, the Court has refused to extend liability beyond
circumstances in which a duty to refrain from self-dealing has been
breached. As a confidentiality agreement itself imposes no duty upon
either party to abstain from using the information to his advantage, it
is unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow such obligations to
serve as the basis of liability.
198. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
199. SEC v. Northern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 176 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding that a reasonable
jury could conclude a duty of confidentiality was imposed on attendees at a press conference
when the U.S. Treasury Department told them to keep the information in confidence).
200. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
201. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997) ("[A] fiduciary's undisclosed,
self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.").
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A second reason insider trading liability should not derive from
confidentiality agreements alone is that allowing this outcome would
come close to accepting the parity-of-information rule the Court has
already rejected. In Chiarella, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that "one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a
duty to do so," thereby rejecting the parity-of-information rule
accepted in Texas Gulf Sulphur.202 Indeed, the Chiarella Court held
that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information."203 As a result, it is not
enough to merely trade on confidential information; the party must
also have a duty to refrain from doing so. 204
As noted above, it is also exceptionally easy to establish a duty
of confidentiality. To do so, a disclosing party need only declare that
information should be kept confidential. Allowing a duty-which could
result in insider trading liability for the party receiving the
information-to be imposed so simply puts a near-moratorium on the
use of all confidential information in the securities markets. The only
information that could be used without worry of future liability is
information obtained without the magic words: "keep it confidential."
It would be a strange rule indeed that allows criminal fines, treble
damages, and a possible prison sentence to turn on such a phrase. 205
Third, premising insider trading liability on the breach of a
duty of confidentiality would carry liability beyond the bounds of the
securities laws. As established in Santa Fe, the securities laws do not
even cover all breaches of fiduciary duties. 206 Further, as the Supreme
Court stated in Marine Bank v. Weaver in 1982, "Congress, in enacting
the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy
202. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (adopting a parity-of-information rule).
203. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
204. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 ("[S]ome tippees must assume an insider's duty to the
shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made
available to them improperly."); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991)
("[A] fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential
information.").
205. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) (2008) (allowing for
treble damages for insider trading violations); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2008) (allowing for criminal fines and prison
sentences for insider trading violations).
206. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (holding a claim of fiduciary
breach only states a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 if the alleged conduct is manipulative or
deceptive); see also O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (stating Santa Fe underscored that "§ 10(b) is not
an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban').
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for all fraud."207 The Court reiterated this view as recently as 2008
when it held in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc. that "[s]ection 10(b) does not incorporate common-law
fraud into federal law."2 08 By extending the securities laws to cover
breaches of confidentiality agreements, the insider trading doctrine
would essentially become a federal remedy for common-law fraud and
breach of contract. As confidentiality contracts are typically relegated
to state law, expanding the insider trading doctrine to such contracts
would conflict with the ruling in Santa Fe that such state law issues
should be left to state law.2 09
Fourth, one who is subject to a duty of confidentiality and
trades on the information has not engaged in the deceptive conduct
required by § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and the Supreme Court. Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act specifically prohibits the use of "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 210 In enacting Rule
10b-5 under this provision, the Commission established that among
other things, it is unlawful "[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."211
In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that for a claim of fraud under
Rule 10b-5 to be sufficient, it must allege conduct that is manipulative
or deceptive within the meaning of § 10(b). 212 Further, in the context
of insider trading, the Court held in Chiarella that although "[s]ection
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision ... what it catches
must be fraud."213 O'Hagan clearly affirmed this principle when
stating that "[dieception through nondisclosure is central to [the
misappropriation theory]."214 The bottom line is that clearly no action
can be considered a violation of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 unless it
amounts to fraud.
Trading on information one agrees only to maintain in
confidence fails to qualify as deceptive or fraudulent conduct under
207. 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
208. 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008).
209. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478 ("A. . . factor in determining whether Congress intended
to create a federal cause of action in these circumstances is 'whether the cause of action (is) one
traditionally relegated to state law.' " (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40
(1977))).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2008).
211. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
212. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74.
213. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
214. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
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§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because no duty is breached in doing so. By
promising to keep information confidential, one is not agreeing to
refrain from trading on the information or not to use it for personal
benefit. Rather, as the Cuban court noted, a duty of confidentiality
only requires that the information be kept confidential. 215 Therefore,
trading on information obtained while under a duty of confidentiality
cannot be considered fraudulent or deceptive because the trader has
not disclosed the information, and consequently there is no breach.
Such an argument mirrors that of the Supreme Court in O'Hagan,
where it found that the misappropriator's feigned fidelity to the source
of the information is central to liability: "if the fiduciary discloses to
the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there
is no 'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation."216 Under both
scenarios, if the use of the information is not fraudulent, it cannot be
the basis of liability.
Although one can argue that the disclosing party generally has
the expectation that a trader under a duty of confidentiality will
refrain from using the information to his own benefit, courts have
repeatedly found that the mere expectations of a party are insufficient
to establish insider trading liability. 21 7 This principle would ignore the
holding in Chiarella that liability cannot be imposed absent a specific
duty to refrain from trading and that such a duty does not arise from
the mere possession of confidential information. 218 The Court
confirmed that this rule applies under the misappropriation theory in
O'Hagan by reemphasizing that a specific duty to refrain from using
the information is needed for liability and that no general duty
exists. 219
Additionally, as the Second Circuit noted in Chestman, this
requisite duty "cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person
215. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725-26 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, No. 09-10996,
2010 WL 3633059 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010) (finding that an obligation to keep information
confidential is separate from a duty to not use the inside information for personal benefit).
216. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
217. See, e.g., Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that
the expectation on the part of the disclosing party that the recipient will refrain from trading on
the nonpublic information is insufficient to impose the necessary duty); SEC v. Talbot, 430 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (same); SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (C.D. Cal.
1988) (same). See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 75 (noting that the decision in Walton is
generally regarded as an accurate statement of the law). This suggests that other portions of
Rule 10b5-2 are also invalid, such as Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) which extends insider trading liability to
those who have a history or pattern of sharing confidential information. Whether the SEC has
also exceeded its authority by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) is beyond the scope of this Note, which
is limited to an analysis of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) and confidentiality agreements.
218. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233, 238.
219. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661.
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with confidential information" because simply disclosing nonpublic
information in no way changes the relationship between the parties.220
Given that a specific duty must exist before a party can be found liable
and that the expectations of the disclosing party fail to create any
such duty on the part of the recipient, liability cannot be based upon
these expectations.
Furthermore, as insider trading can bring with it criminal
liability, including prison time, there is a strong argument that
relying exclusively on the expectations of the disclosing party as to the
extent of the confidentiality agreement would violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 221 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that criminal laws that do not provide adequate notice of
the criminality of an act violate due process. 222 Permitting liability to
be based upon the intentions of the disclosing party would fail to give
adequate notice because it requires the trader to divine the intentions
of the disclosing party.223 To provide fair notice, liability must turn on
the terms of the agreement itself.
All of these points require the Supreme Court to find that the
SEC has exceeded its authority in enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), which
prohibits those under confidentiality agreements from trading even
though such conduct is not deceptive under § 10(b). When the "judicial
oak" that Rule 10b-5 has become outgrows its statutory roots, it must
be trimmed. However, revoking the Rule would generate uncertainty
in the market as to which types of duties can serve as the basis of
insider trading liability. This could deter the disclosure of confidential
information to outsiders when doing so would increase efficiency or
otherwise benefit the corporation and its shareholders. A new,
uniform rule must therefore be adopted to allow for such beneficial
disclosure to those who lack a fiduciary or similar duty, yet prevent
recipients of the information from trading on it.
220. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1991).
221. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ."); see also Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2, 15 U.S.C. §
78u-1(a) (2008) (allowing for treble damages for insider trading violations); Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2008) (allowing for criminal
fines and prison sentences for insider trading violations).
222. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) ("This Court has repeatedly stated that
criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is
done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.").
223. Such an interpretation has also been used in the field of tax law. E.g., United States v.
Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131-32, 1135 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding a definition of "gift" which would
require the donee to divine the intentions of the donor to be unsatisfactory in circumstances
where criminal liability is at stake).
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IV. FILLING THE VOID CREATED AFTER ABANDONING RULE
10b5-2(b)(1)
In crafting a legal standard to replace Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) and
define the duties sufficient to establish insider trading liability, a
number of factors must be taken into account. This Part briefly
addresses these considerations, and goes on to propose that insider
trading liability should be based only on fiduciary duties or express
agreements to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information.
Lastly, it explains why liability should not be limited only to those
who are subject to a fiduciary duty.
A. Solution: Insider Trading Liability Should be Based on Fiduciary
Duties and Agreements to Refrain from Self-Dealing
Several considerations must be taken into account in
establishing a workable rule to replace Rule 10b-2(b)(1). First and
foremost, the breach of the duty relied upon for liability must involve
some type of deception or fraud so that it is within the statutory
bounds of § 10(b). In order to heed the Supreme Court's warnings in
Santa Fe, the solution must also not necessitate the federalization of
any more state common law than is required. Any viable solution
must further comply with the Exchange Act's goals: "to insure honest
securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." 224
Finally, the solution should not create a parity-of-information rule, as
such a rule would conflict with the Court's holding in Chiarella and
may potentially discourage the disclosure of confidential information
when doing so would be advantageous to the corporation.
The solution that best satisfies these criteria is to hold that the
duty requirement is only satisfied by a fiduciary duty or a duty arising
from an express agreement to refrain from using the information for
personal gain. Such a solution is similar to the rule adopted by the
court in Cuban225 and should be accepted as the basis of insider
224. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
225. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, No. 09-10996, 2010
WL 3633059 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010) (holding that liability "can arise by agreement absent a
preexisting fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship" so long as the agreement imposes a 'legal
duty to refrain from trading on or otherwise using the information for personal gain"). Unlike the
Cuban court's rule, the proposed solution does not explicitly extend liability to "fiduciary-like"
duties. As explained above, a relationship is only sufficient to serve as the basis of insider
trading liability if it includes a duty to refrain from self-dealing, which is the element of the
relationship that makes it "fiduciary-like." See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text; infra
notes 237-39 and accompanying text. Because the fiduciary duty and agreement elements of the
proposed solution already encompass duties to refrain from self-dealing both imposed by law and
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trading liability because it (1) restricts Rule 10b-5 to its statutory
bounds, (2) minimizes the federalization of state law, (3) avoids the
adoption of a parity-of-information rule while furthering the goals of
the Exchange Act, and (4) allows for the free flow of beneficial
information.
First, such a rule limits insider trading liability to the
statutory bounds of § 10(b) as required by Santa Fe-unlike Rule
10b5-2(b)(1)-because it restricts liability to those who have engaged
in deceptive conduct. 226 The Supreme Court clearly established in
Chiarella and reaffirmed in Dirks that one bound by a fiduciary
relationship engages in fraud actionable under Rule 10b-5 if he trades
on that information for his own benefit.227 Similarly, a trader who
agrees to refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information but then
trades on the information also engages in deceptive conduct as
required by § 10(b). As the Cuban court noted, a breach of a duty
which arose by agreement can be seen as "conferring a stronger
footing for imposing liability for deceptive conduct" because the
agreement expressly restricted the use of the information for personal
gain, whereas a fiduciary duty alone merely creates the duty to refrain
by "operation of law due to his relationship with the information
source."22 8 Because breaching either a fiduciary or an accepted duty to
refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information is deceptive, basing
liability on such duties would anchor the prohibition against insider
trading to its statutory roots.
Second, restricting liability to those with fiduciary
relationships or duties to refrain from benefitting from the
information also satisfies Santa Fe's second limitation prohibiting the
federalization of common law misconduct in the securities markets. 229
While it may seem that a solution permitting one to accept a duty by
agreement would go against Santa Fe by allowing the securities laws
to delve into the realm of state contract law, a closer examination of
the insider trading doctrine reveals that Santa Fe's second limitation
on Rule 10b-5 is flexible in regard to insider trading. While the Court
in Santa Fe held that Rule 10b-5 failed to reach claims in which
voluntarily agreed upon, additionally extending liability to "fiduciary-like" relationships is
unnecessary and redundant.
226. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977).
227. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (noting a duty to disclose arises from the
existence of a fiduciary relationship); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) ("[T]he
duty to disclose arises when one party has information 'that the other party is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary [relationship]....) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
551(2)(a) (1976)).
228. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
229. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74, 478.
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"shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary,"230 the very essence
of claims in classical insider trading cases is that the shareholder is
treated unfairly by a fiduciary. 231 Therefore, although the Court in
Santa Fe attempted to avoid federalizing the portion of state corporate
law that deals with securities transactions, 232 this is precisely what
the insider trading prohibition does. 2 33 Because fiduciary relationships
themselves are generally defined and regulated by state law, the most
extreme application of Santa Fe would leave all insider trading to
state law, rather than federal law.
Additionally, if the courts strictly adhered to Santa Fe's
warning against the creation of a federal fiduciary standard, the duty
element of the insider trading doctrine would vary from state to state,
depending on the fiduciary principles of each jurisdiction. This would
be especially problematic in many states where insider trading in fact
does not breach the directors' or officers' fiduciary duties. 234 Because it
would be absurd to permit insider trading to be legal in these states
while it is illegal in others, the securities laws must federalize and
rely on some common law relationships to determine liability. This
view is supported by three Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s in
which the Court seemingly viewed the common law as the foundation
for Rule 10b-5 liability, along with a decision from 2005 in which the
Court again looked to the common law to establish the requirements
for private Rule 10b-5 cases. 2 35 Although the Court has warned
against the acceptance of state law misconduct as the basis of federal
liability under the securities laws, 2 36 the message the Court has sent
regarding the extent that common law may be used is mixed, at best.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court precedent is not fully
consistent as to the degree to which state common law causes of action
may be relied upon in creating insider trading liability, given the
230. Id. at 477.
231. Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 1613.
232. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
233. Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 1613.
234. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 59-60.
235. See Nagy, supra note 84, at 1374-75 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336
(2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,
Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985); and Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
389 (1983) as instances in which the Supreme Court has looked to the common law as the
foundation for Rule 10b-5 liability).
236. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162
(2008) ("Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law."); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) ("Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to
provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud."); Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479-80 (noting that federal
fiduciary standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
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ruling in Santa Fe, the Court's adoption of the common law should at
least be minimized. Adopting the proposed rule would leave the
amount of federalized common law essentially unchanged because the
emphasis of the insider trading doctrine is already on prohibiting self-
dealing in nonpublic information by those with a duty to refrain from
doing so. The principal aspect of fiduciary relationships that courts
have focused on in establishing liability is the fiduciary's duty to
refrain from self-dealing. 237 Indeed, a central reason the Supreme
Court originally adopted the duty requirement in Chiarella was to
ensure that those "who have an obligation to place the shareholder's
welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through
fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information."238 The Court again
heavily relied on the fiduciary's duty to abstain from self-dealing in
Dirks by establishing that the test for tipper-tippee insider trading
liability is "whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure."239 Because the doctrine already
prohibits trading on nonpublic information in violation of a duty to
abstain from self-dealing, this duty has already been federalized by
the Court. Extending insider trading liability to agreements
forbidding the use of the information for personal gain would therefore
not federalize common law beyond what is already within the federal
realm. Thus the proposed solution satisfies the requirement of Santa
Fe that the securities laws should attempt to avoid federalizing state
common law.
Third, a rule extending liability only to those with a duty to
refrain from self-dealing avoids the adoption of a rigid parity-of-
information rule while continuing to further the goals of the Exchange
Act. The Supreme Court in Dirks recognized the importance of
avoiding a parity-of-information rule by noting that allowing
securities analysts to obtain and utilize material, nonpublic
information is "necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."240
Allowing investors to "ferret out and analyze information" and then
use this information enhances market efficiency, aids in the accurate
237. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) ("[I]nsiders [are] forbidden by their fiduciary
relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage . . . .");
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980) (noting that because corporate insiders
obtain the confidential information from their position, they have a duty to disclose it before
trading to avoid taking unfair advantage of the stockholders); see also Bainbridge, supra note 19,
at 1203 (arguing the fiduciary duty relevant to insider trading liability is the duty to refrain from
self-dealing).
238. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
239. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
240. Id. at 658.
[Vol. 63:5:14691502
TRIMMING THE "JUDICIAL OAK"
pricing of securities, and ensures honest securities markets.241 By only
restricting the use of nonpublic information when it is in the hands of
those who have a duty to not personally gain from the information,
this solution encourages investors to search for such information
without placing a moratorium on its use. At the same time, the
proposed solution satisfies the Exchange Act's goals of promoting
honesty and investor confidence in the securities markets because all
those who are under any type of duty to not personally benefit from
nonpublic information will be excluded from trading.242 In this way,
the proposed rule adequately balances the goals of promoting investor
confidence and creating honest securities markets without restricting
the use of all nonpublic information in securities transactions.
Finally, this solution also allows for beneficial and necessary
information to be shared by corporate officials without the concern
that it will be used for the personal gain of another. There are often
times when disclosure of inside information to a party who has no
fiduciary or similar obligation to the corporation or its shareholders is
either necessary or economically beneficial, and in such
circumstances, disclosure of the nonpublic information should be
encouraged. 243 However, corporate officials must also be allowed to
restrict the use of this information to ensure that it is not used to the
detriment of shareholders. Allowing corporations to share information
and limit the use of that information by an agreement to abstain from
personally benefitting from its use promotes market fairness while
still allowing the confidential information to be disclosed. The SEC
would likely accept such a rule because it would permit information to
be shared as needed, yet continue to allow for prosecution of those who
fraudulently self-deal in the information. Indeed, permitting duties to
refrain from self-dealing to arise through agreement is likely what the
SEC was attempting to establish by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) in the
first place, as it was meant to "reflect[] the common-sense notion ...
[that the required duty] can be created by an agreement between two
241. Id. (quoting In re Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket
1401, 1981 WL 36329, at *6 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
242. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (stating the purpose of the
Exchange Act).
243. E.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (disclosure to printer necessary so that the
announcements of corporate takeover bids could be made); SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713,
717 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, No. 09-10996, 2010 WL 3633059 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010)
(disclosure of nonpublic information regarding a PIPE offering to a wealthy investor to enlist his
participation and raise capital); see also Beeson, supra note 50, at 1113 (noting an over-inclusive
duty to disclose would deter the free flow of information beneficial to the market).
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parties."244 Additionally, the proposed solution would likely be
accepted by the Supreme Court. In Dirks, the Court found that
confidential information could, and in some cases should, be shared,
and that liability would not arise unless the "insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." 245
Because a rule limiting insider trading liability to fiduciaries
and those who by agreement accept a duty to abstain from self-dealing
satisfies all the criteria of a workable rule, the proposed solution
should be adopted to fill the void created by abandoning Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1).
B. Liability Should Not be Limited to Those with Fiduciary Duties
While some contend that liability should be limited to
relationships bearing the "hallmark characteristics" of traditional
fiduciary relationships, 246 which would mean that an agreement to
refrain from self-dealing is insufficient to create liability, such a view
is inconsistent with the purpose of the Exchange Act and the
development of the insider trading doctrine. The Exchange Act was
enacted to ensure the honesty of the securities markets and to
promote investor confidence. 247 To do so, § 10(b) prohibits deceptive
and manipulative practices to eliminate fraud from the sale or
purchase of securities. Limiting liability to those who have fiduciary
duties ignores the reality that certain situations-such as in the
merger context-may require one party to give confidential
information to another. If liability were limited to those with fiduciary
duties, then those who are given information for valid business
purposes after agreeing to refrain from self-dealing in the information
would be able to use the information in the securities markets without
federal liability. While there would still be liability under state law for
breach of contract, such laws would vary from state to state. Such
244. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,603 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, & 249).
245. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
discretionary authority and dependency "represent the measure of the paradigmatic fiduciary
relationship" and a duty is only sufficient to establish liability if it shares these qualities); United
States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1011, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that "an express
agreement can provide the basis for misappropriation liability only if the express agreement sets
forth a relationship with the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship," such as superiority,
dominance, or control); Tyler J. Bexley, Note, Reining in Maverick Traders: Rule lOb5-2 and
Confidentiality Agreements, 88 TEX. L. REV. 195, 213-14 (2009) (arguing the SEC should be
required to prove the classic elements of a fiduciary duty before insider trading liability arises).
247. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
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variation would fail to engender confidence in the market, contrary to
what the laws intended, and would discourage parties from making
necessary disclosures. Even worse, what would happen to investors
such as bondholders, to whom directors and officers owe no fiduciary
duties? 24 8 Under a rule limiting liability to fiduciary relationships,
insiders could trade on confidential information in debt securities and
completely escape liability! This would obviously be an unreasonable
direction for the law to take after abandoning Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).
Additionally, such an argument ignores the development of the
insider trading doctrine. While the Supreme Court has always
required a party to have a duty to refrain from self-dealing in the
confidential information in order to be liable for insider trading, the
Court has shown that it is willing to stretch that requirement as
needed to promote honest securities markets.249 In Dirks, the Court
was willing to extend liability to tippees even though they owe no
duties to shareholders. 250 The Court held that a tippee could assume a
duty to refrain from self-dealing if the tipper breached a duty in
disclosing the information to the tippee.251 In essence, both the tipper's
duty and breach of that duty transfer to the tippee, and this fictional
fiduciary relationship is enough to establish liability.252 The Court's
readiness to expand liability to tippees in Dirks simply because "[tlhe
need for a ban on some tippee trading [was] clear"253 was again
evidenced in O'Hagan's acceptance of the misappropriation theory.254
Allowing a breached duty owed to the source of the information to
create insider trading liability-even though the source suffers little
or no harm from the breach-further establishes that the Court is
willing to stretch the duty requirement if doing so would lead to a
desirable policy outcome.255
Because Dirks and O'Hagan both reveal the elasticity of the
duty element of insider trading in light of valid policy concerns,
limiting the requirement to fiduciary relationships alone would be
unduly restrictive. The best solution is to only extend liability to those
248. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 59; see also Faith Stevelman, Globalization and
Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges for the Academy, Future Lawyers, and Corporate
Law, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 817, 840 (2009) (noting directors do not owe fiduciary duties to
bondholders as they are expected to protect themselves through the indenture contract).
249. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
250. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
251. Id.
252. See Nagy, supra note 84, at 1338 (explaining that this fiduciary fiction was essential to
the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks).
253. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
254. Nagy, supra note 84, at 1339.
255. Id. at 1339-40.
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with fiduciary duties or other obligations to abstain from personally
benefitting from the nonpublic information. This approach
acknowledges the Court's pliability in regard to the duty requirement
while restricting liability to obligations to refrain from self-dealing as
the Court has previously done. By adopting such a rule, the efficient
disclosure and protection of confidential information the SEC sought
to secure by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) will be achieved without
expanding the doctrine beyond its statutory roots.
V. CONCLUSION
While Congress has delegated a great deal of authority to the
SEC, such power is not without its limits. One such limit is the
Commission's ability to hold liable those who trade on nonpublic
information that they only have a duty to keep in confidence. Because
such an action is neither deceptive nor fraudulent, holding such a
trader liable for the action would exceed the SEC's statutory authority
bestowed by § 10(b). Therefore, by enacting Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), which
attempts to predicate liability on confidentiality agreements alone, the
Commission has gone beyond its delegated authority, and the Rule
must be held invalid. However, revoking the Rule would create a void
that could possibly deter the disclosure of confidential information
when disclosure would be both efficient and beneficial to the market.
To fill this void, a rule resting liability only upon fiduciary duties and
agreements to refrain from personally benefitting from the use of
confidential information should be adopted. This rule best satisfies the
purpose of the Exchange Act while remaining within its scope, thereby
preventing the Rule 10b-5 "judicial oak" from becoming more
expansive than it already is.
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